commit 137991396d037ccdea106a1ec200e492f16d8e3d
author Harald Alvestrand <hta@webrtc.org> Mon Mar 09 18:39:36 2020
committer Commit Bot <commit-bot@chromium.org> Mon Mar 09 19:23:44 2020
tree 68bba4311d3dee91c73b7510a8c66f39cda3053d
parent 30026214b13535a9fe1c47f1463378fbf976c643

Make a switch to disable DTLS 1.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 downgrade in WebRTC.

This reverts commit af1f8655b2cb69af382396ea642eb0a2bf04bb4d

Landing the change with default set to
"enabled" (DTLS 1.0 will continue to work by default),
so that flipping the default can be a separate CL.

Original change's description:
> Revert "Disable DTLS 1.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 downgrade in WebRTC."
>
> This reverts commit 7276b974b78ea4f409d8738b1b6f1515f7a8968e.
>
> Reason for revert: Changing to a later Chrome release.
>
> Original change's description:
> > Disable DTLS 1.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 downgrade in WebRTC.
> >
> > This change disables DTLS 1.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 in WebRTC by default. This
> > is part of a larger effort at Google to remove old TLS protocols:
> > https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/modernizing-transport-security.html
> >
> > For the M74 timeline I have added a disabled by default field trial
> > WebRTC-LegacyTlsProtocols which can be enabled to support these cipher suites
> > as consumers move away from these legacy cipher protocols but it will be off
> > in Chrome.
> >
> > This is compliant with the webrtc-security-arch specification which states:
> >
> >    All Implementations MUST implement DTLS 1.2 with the
> >    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and the P-256
> >    curve [FIPS186].  Earlier drafts of this specification required DTLS
> >    1.0 with the cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and
> >    at the time of this writing some implementations do not support DTLS
> >    1.2; endpoints which support only DTLS 1.2 might encounter
> >    interoperability issues.  The DTLS-SRTP protection profile
> >    SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 MUST be supported for SRTP.
> >    Implementations MUST favor cipher suites which support (Perfect
> >    Forward Secrecy) PFS over non-PFS cipher suites and SHOULD favor AEAD
> >    over non-AEAD cipher suites.
> >
> > Bug: webrtc:10261
> > Change-Id: I847c567592911cc437f095376ad67585b4355fc0
> > Reviewed-on: https://webrtc-review.googlesource.com/c/src/+/125141
> > Commit-Queue: Benjamin Wright <benwright@webrtc.org>
> > Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@webrtc.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Qingsi Wang <qingsi@webrtc.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#27006}
>
> TBR=steveanton@webrtc.org,davidben@webrtc.org,qingsi@webrtc.org,benwright@webrtc.org
>
> # Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
>
> Bug: webrtc:10261
> Change-Id: I34727e65c069e1fb2ad71838828ad0a22b5fe811
> Reviewed-on: https://webrtc-review.googlesource.com/c/src/+/130367
> Commit-Queue: Benjamin Wright <benwright@webrtc.org>
> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Wright <benwright@webrtc.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#27403}

Bug: webrtc:10261
Change-Id: I28c6819d37665976e396df280b4abf48fb91d533
Reviewed-on: https://webrtc-review.googlesource.com/c/src/+/169851
Commit-Queue: Harald Alvestrand <hta@webrtc.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Wright <benwright@webrtc.org>
Reviewed-by: Qingsi Wang <qingsi@webrtc.org>
Reviewed-by: Harald Alvestrand <hta@webrtc.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#30733}