| /* | |
| * Copyright (c) 2018 The WebRTC project authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license | |
| * that can be found in the LICENSE file in the root of the source | |
| * tree. An additional intellectual property rights grant can be found | |
| * in the file PATENTS. All contributing project authors may | |
| * be found in the AUTHORS file in the root of the source tree. | |
| */ | |
| #include "api/audio_codecs/audio_codec_pair_id.h" | |
| #include <atomic> | |
| #include <cstdint> | |
| #include "rtc_base/checks.h" | |
| namespace webrtc { | |
| namespace { | |
| // Returns a new value that it has never returned before. You may call it at | |
| // most 2^63 times in the lifetime of the program. Note: The returned values | |
| // may be easily predictable. | |
| uint64_t GetNextId() { | |
| static std::atomic<uint64_t> next_id(0); | |
| // Atomically increment `next_id`, and return the previous value. Relaxed | |
| // memory order is sufficient, since all we care about is that different | |
| // callers return different values. | |
| const uint64_t new_id = next_id.fetch_add(1, std::memory_order_relaxed); | |
| // This check isn't atomic with the increment, so if we start 2^63 + 1 | |
| // invocations of GetNextId() in parallel, the last one to do the atomic | |
| // increment could return the ID 0 before any of the others had time to | |
| // trigger this DCHECK. We blithely assume that this won't happen. | |
| RTC_DCHECK_LT(new_id, uint64_t{1} << 63) << "Used up all ID values"; | |
| return new_id; | |
| } | |
| // Make an integer ID more unpredictable. This is a 1:1 mapping, so you can | |
| // feed it any value, but the idea is that you can feed it a sequence such as | |
| // 0, 1, 2, ... and get a new sequence that isn't as trivially predictable, so | |
| // that users won't rely on it being consecutive or increasing or anything like | |
| // that. | |
| constexpr uint64_t ObfuscateId(uint64_t id) { | |
| // Any nonzero coefficient that's relatively prime to 2^64 (that is, any odd | |
| // number) and any constant will give a 1:1 mapping. These high-entropy | |
| // values will prevent the sequence from being trivially predictable. | |
| // | |
| // Both the multiplication and the addition going to overflow almost always, | |
| // but that's fine---we *want* arithmetic mod 2^64. | |
| return uint64_t{0x85fdb20e1294309a} + uint64_t{0xc516ef5c37462469} * id; | |
| } | |
| // The first ten values. Verified against the Python function | |
| // | |
| // def f(n): | |
| // return (0x85fdb20e1294309a + 0xc516ef5c37462469 * n) % 2**64 | |
| // | |
| // Callers should obviously not depend on these exact values... | |
| // | |
| // (On Visual C++, we have to disable warning C4307 (integral constant | |
| // overflow), even though unsigned integers have perfectly well-defined | |
| // overflow behavior.) | |
| #ifdef _MSC_VER | |
| #pragma warning(push) | |
| #pragma warning(disable : 4307) | |
| #endif | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(0) == uint64_t{0x85fdb20e1294309a}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(1) == uint64_t{0x4b14a16a49da5503}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(2) == uint64_t{0x102b90c68120796c}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(3) == uint64_t{0xd5428022b8669dd5}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(4) == uint64_t{0x9a596f7eefacc23e}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(5) == uint64_t{0x5f705edb26f2e6a7}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(6) == uint64_t{0x24874e375e390b10}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(7) == uint64_t{0xe99e3d93957f2f79}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(8) == uint64_t{0xaeb52cefccc553e2}, ""); | |
| static_assert(ObfuscateId(9) == uint64_t{0x73cc1c4c040b784b}, ""); | |
| #ifdef _MSC_VER | |
| #pragma warning(pop) | |
| #endif | |
| } // namespace | |
| AudioCodecPairId AudioCodecPairId::Create() { | |
| return AudioCodecPairId(ObfuscateId(GetNextId())); | |
| } | |
| } // namespace webrtc |